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Abstract
Background: During an influenza pandemic, a substantial proportion of transmission is thought to occur in
households. We used data on influenza progression in individuals and their contacts collected by the City of
Milwaukee Health Department (MHD) to study the transmission of pandemic influenza A/H1N1 virus in 362
households in Milwaukee, WI, and the effects of oseltamivir treatment and chemoprophylaxis.
Methods: 135 households had chronological information on symptoms and oseltamivir usage for all household
members. The effect of oseltamivir treatment and other factors on the household secondary attack rate was
estimated using univariate and multivariate logistic regression with households as the unit of analysis. The effect of
oseltamivir treatment and other factors on the individual secondary attack rate was estimated using univariate and
multivariate logistic regression with individual household contacts as the unit of analysis, and a generalized
estimating equations approach was used to fit the model to allow for clustering within households.
Results: Oseltamivir index treatment on onset day or the following day (early treatment) was associated with a 42%
reduction (OR: 0.58, 95% CI: 0.19, 1.73) in the odds of one or more secondary infections in a household and a 50%
reduction (OR: 0.5, 95% CI: 0.17, 1.46) in the odds of a secondary infection in individual contacts. The confidence
bounds are wide due to a small sample of households with early oseltamivir index usage - in 29 such households, 5
had a secondary attack. Younger household contacts were at higher risk of infection (OR: 2.79, 95% CI: 1.50-5.20).
Conclusions: Early oseltamivir treatment may be beneficial in preventing H1N1pdm influenza transmission; this
may have relevance to future control measures for influenza pandemics. Larger randomized trials are needed to
confirm this finding statistically.
Background
With the advent of the influenza season in the Northern
hemisphere, various measures to control the spread of an
epidemic and to reduce severe morbidity and mortality
are being utilized. One type of such control measures is
the usage of antiviral drugs, specifically the neuramini-
dase inhibitors oseltamivir and zanamivir. Recent CDC
guidelines http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/antiviral.htm
emphasize antiviral drug usage for severe cases as well as
for high risk individuals. As the 2009 H1N1 pandemic
has shown, large scale vaccine distribution in many coun-
tries may occur only after an epidemic has peaked; under
these circumstances, the appropriate use of a limited sup-
ply of antivirals becomes even more paramount.
The ability of oseltamivir, particularly if taken during
the earlier stages of influenza infection, to alleviate
symptoms and shorten their duration is well documen-
ted for seasonal influenza [1-3]. For H1N1pdm infec-
tions, two recent studies suggest that early oseltamivir
treatment for hospitalized H1N1 patients was beneficial
in reducing the risk of death [4] and ICU admission [5].
In [6] a subset of the present authors consider the net
benefits of pre-dispensing antivirals to high-risk indivi-
duals during an influenza pandemic, where the measure
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in the whole population. One factor which makes pre-
dispensing beneficial is that individuals to whom antivir-
als have been pre-dispensed may be able to initiate
treatment early, reducing their risk of progression to
severe disease. In this paper we study another benefit of
early oseltamivir treatment, namely its potential role in
preventing influenza transmission to others [7].
One setting where influenza transmission can be stu-
died is within households. This is particularly valuable
in the early stages of an epidemic, where multiple out-
of-household infections are rare, and subsequent (sec-
ondary) cases can be reasonably attributed to the first
case in a household (the index), and possibly to other
secondary cases. In this context, we studied the relation
between the timing of oseltamivir usage for the index
case and the existence of secondary case(s) in a house-
hold. Our study is based on the data gathered by the
City of Milwaukee Health Department, where extensive
efforts on epidemiological tracing of confirmed cases
and their contacts made it possible to recover the
chronology of symptom onsets and oseltamivir usage in
a number of households.
T h em a i nq u e s t i o nw es o u g h tt oa d d r e s si sw h e t h e r
early index oseltamivir usage (on onset day or the fol-
lowing day) has benefits in reducing the risk of trans-
mission to other household members (and thus likely
also to other individuals outside the household). Data
shows that indeed such benefit is noticeable. However
the confidence bounds are wide and the conclusions are
not statistically significant due to a small sample of
households where early index oseltamivir usage took
place; we also discuss the effect of potential biases and
our attempts at addressing them. Results similar to ours
with a statistically significant conclusion for a larger
study of seasonal influenza appear in [8].
Methods
Sources of data
Epidemic data gathered by the Milwaukee Health
Department between mid April to Mid June 2009 was
used in the study. Initially cases were concentrated on
or near the south side of Milwaukee which has a large
Hispanic population, however in a matter of weeks the
epidemic had spread throughout the city.
Data on influenza progression in individuals and their
contacts were collected by the City of Milwaukee Health
Department (MHD), Division of Disease Control and
Environmental Health. Cases with confirmed pandemic
influenza H1N1 infection by RT-PCR were entered into
a centralized database. Cases were then assigned to pub-
lic health nurses for public health case management.
Public health case management consisted of completion
of the MHD H1N1 surveillance form, identification of
possible source and spread of disease, intervention to
prevent additional spread as well as general health and
hygiene education. Case monitoring was done through
phone interviews; generally 1-2 phone contacts with
households (beyond the initial detection) took place.
Only households where the last phone interview
occurred at least a week after the index onset were
included in the study.
Individual case report/surveillance forms filled out by
the nurses had demographic information, information
on confirmation status, presence of influenza-like illness
(ILI), listing of symptoms/onset date, antiviral/antibiotic
usage etc, as well as (generally less complete) informa-
tion on individual’s contacts; initial information was
updated through phone contacts. Case report forms
were grouped by households, with some members
having an individual form, while others (possibly symp-
tomatic) not having one.
Data from case report forms from 362 households
were entered electronically. The primary analysis for
the oseltamivir effect is based on the 135 of the above
362 households that fulfilled the following criteria a)-d).
a) Symptom onset dates for all household members
were listed.
b) The primary (index) case in a household had a
laboratory-confirmed infection and an individual case
report form with contacts listed, and the case report
form(s) for the household members contained no con-
tradictions (e.g. two case report forms listing the same
household with different information).
c) The household had a follow-up period of at least 7
days since the index symptom onset.
d) Start date for oseltamivir usage by the index (if
any), and the start date of any secondary oseltamivir
usage in a household could be ascertained.
Contacts were considered infected if they were either
confirmed, or had ILI (fever + cough or sore throat), or
had at least two symptoms listed. Fever in cases posses-
sing a case report form had a temperature reading for
the majority of cases; fever in symptomatic cases fre-
quently had no temperature reading next to it. A con-
tact with only one symptom or with only the
“symptoms” box checked disqualified the household
from being used for the primary analysis unless the
onset date for that contact was given and it was no ear-
lier than the first secondary onset in a household (3
such contacts with one symptom each appear in the pri-
mary analysis cohort).
T oi n c r e a s ee f f i c i e n c yo fd a t ae n t r yi nt e r m so fa s s e s -
sing the effect of early oseltamivir usage, some of the
cases for the primary analysis were entered into a data-
base from paper forms only if they met criteria a)-d).
This leads to no bias for the selection of the primary
analysis cohort as all the households obeying criteria
Goldstein et al. BMC Infectious Diseases 2010, 10:211
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/10/211
Page 2 of 7a)-d) among the first several hundred households (in
chronological order) made it to the primary analysis
cohort. We recognized that some of the selection cri-
teria a)-d) may bias estimates of other quantities we
were interested in, such as the time between the index
onset and the first secondary infection in a household.
Thus, in addition to households screened for obeying
criteria a)-d), we entered data from a number of house-
holds which appeared in chronological order without
checking whether they obey any criteria. The distribu-
tion of times to first secondary case in the household
was assessed from 128 of these households - those
households were selected to obey criteria a)-b) but not
necessarily criteria c)-d) which may bias the latter distri-
bution. The first secondary infection was used because
of the lack of information on the subsequent path of
transmission, such that it was uncertain whether each
non-index infection represented a secondary or tertiary
or further infection.
Statistical Analysis
Household characteristics were described with means
and standard deviations, and medians and inter-quartile
ranges. Secondary attack rates at the household level
were estimated as the proportion of households with
one or more secondary cases. Secondary attack rates at
the individual level were estimated as the proportion of
household contacts who were infected (based on the
definition of infection described above).
The effect of oseltamivir treatment and other factors
on the household secondary attack rate was estimated
using univariate and multivariate logistic regression with
households as the unit of analysis.
The effect of oseltamivir treatment and other factors
on the individual secondary attack rate was estimated
using univariate and multivariate logistic regression with
individual household contacts as the unit of analysis,
and a generalized estimating equations approach (robust
variance estimator) was used to fit the model to allow
for clustering within households [9]. For 21 contacts
with unknown age, multivariable ORs were adjusted via
multiple imputations.
We estimated 95% confidence intervals for secondary
attack rates using the exact binomial method at the
household level, and the cluster bootstrap method [10]
at the individual level.
Statistical analyses were performed using R version
2.8.0 (R Development Core Team, Vienna, Austria).
Ethics statement
Our study, which utilized anonymized data on H1N1
cases and their household contacts collected by the Mil-
waukee Health department was performed according to
the established guidelines. Our work was reviewed by
the Human Subjects Committee at the Harvard School
of Public Health. Because the research involved existing
data recorded in such a manner that subjects could not
be identified, it was designated “not human subjects”
(protocol # 17770-101).
Results
Timing of oseltamivir usage and transmission: household
level
The timing of oseltamivir usage by index cases is shown
in Table 1. There is a monotonic increase in the prob-
ability of secondary attack with the time from symptom
onset to oseltamivir initiation by the index. Interestingly,
never-users of oseltamivir are less likely to have second-
ary cases in the household than those who used oselta-
mivir on day 2 or day 3. A candidate explanation for
this finding is that it reflects reverse causality; index
cases who had a secondary case in their household were
more likely to receive oseltamivir, perhaps because they
were more likely to seek treatment. Consistent with this
hypothesis, of the 19 households with a secondary attack
where the index took oseltamivir on or after day 3, 12
had the index taking oseltamivir after the day of the sec-
ondary attack, and 3 more took it on the day of the sec-
ondary attack, with only 4 indices starting it before
secondary symptoms.
Table 1 Index oseltamivir start day and HH size vs. secondary attack
Day of index oseltamivir (onset = 0) Total number of households Secondary attack Percent
0 8 1 12.5%
1 21 4 19.0%
2 11 3 27.3%
3+ 51 19 37.3%
Never 44 10 22.7%
HH size
2-3 48 7 14.6%
4 41 14 34.1%
5+ 46 16 34.8%
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hold size and the probability of at least one secondary
case in the household, with an increasing risk of a sec-
ondary attack with household size.
Tables 2 summarizes the results of statistical analysis
of the effect of the timing of index oseltamivir usage,
household size and the age of the index on the existence
of a secondary attack in a household. Oseltamivir use on
the day of symptom onset or the day after was asso-
ciated with a 42% reduction in the odds of a secondary
case in the household compared to use on day 3 or later
or never; this effect is close to the null for use on day 2,
and the confidence intervals for both estimates include
1. Larger household size was associated with a higher
risk of transmission, though the multivariate logistic
regression confidence intervals for the relative risk com-
pared to household sizes 2-3 include 1. Index age
showed no association with the risk of secondary
transmission
Factors associated with transmission at the individual
level
Table 3 shows the relation between the ages of the
indices and their (infected/uninfected) contacts. Each
row lists the index’s age (child/adult). The columns list
the total numbers of household contacts of a certain age
group that all such indices have, and how many of them
were infected. At the individual level we identified infec-
tions in 55/411 household contacts, corresponding to a
secondary attack rate of 13.4%. Table 4 summarizes the
results of statistical analysis of the effect of the timing of
index oseltamivir usage, household size and the ages of
the index and contacts on H1N1 influenza transmission
at the individual level. Oseltamivir use on the day of
symptom onset or the day after was associated with a
50% reduction in the odds of a secondary case in the
household compared to use on day 3 or later or never;
this effect is attenuated for use on day 2, and the confi-
dence intervals for these estimates include 1. Younger
contact age was associated with a higher risk of infec-
tion, while household size showed no association with
individual risk of transmission.
Time from index onset to first secondary infection
We studied the distribution of time from index onset to a
first secondary onset (FSO) in a household. Because of
the clustering of susceptibles, this distribution is inher-
ently shorter than the individual infectiousness profile
distribution, or a serial interval distribution in a mass
action model. One household with FSO > 10 (17) was
discarded as such a long FSO is likely to reflect a trans-
mission from outside the household. The mean (sd) FSO
was 3.32 (2.23). The distribution is plotted in Figure 1.
Discussion
Our analysis of data from City of Milwaukee households
supports the following conclusions: 1) Early oseltamivir
use was associated with approximately a 42% reduction
in the odds of at least one secondary case in the house-
hold, though this finding was not statistically significant
and may be affected by some of the biases described
below 2) Children had a statistically significantly higher
risk of becoming infected than adults. 3) Household size
greater than 3 was associated with an increased risk of
at least one secondary case in the household, though
this effect was statistically significant only in the univari-
ate analysis and could be impacted by a selection bias.
No association between individual risk of a symptomatic
secondary infection and household size was found.
Observational studies of household transmission are
crucial for rapid evidence-gathering in a newly emerging
influenza pandemic, but they are also susceptible to a
number of biases intrinsic to observational studies, com-
pounded by the sometimes formidable logistical
Table 2 Probabilities of at least one secondary case in the household
n Any secondary infections in household
SAR (95% CI) Univariate OR (95% CI) Multivariate OR (95% CI)
Index oseltamivi usage from his/her onset
Within 1 day 29 0.17 (0.06, 0.36) 0.47 (0.16, 1.37) 0.58 (0.19, 1.75)
1-2 days 11 0.27 (0.06, 0.61) 0.85 (0.21, 3.45) 1.15 (0.27, 4.99)
3+ days/No usage 95 0.31 (0.21, 0.41) - -
Household with adult index 37 0.19 (0.08, 0.35) - -
Household with child index 98 0.31 (0.22, 0.41) 1.89 (0.75, 4.78) 1.30 (0.47, 3.57)
Household size (# of ppl)
≤ 3 48 0.15 (0.06, 0.28) 1.00 -
4 41 0.34 (0.20, 0.51) 3.04 (1.09, 8.50) 2.81 (0.98, 8.10)
≥ 5 46 0.35 (0.21, 0.50) 3.12 (1.14, 8.54) 2.73 (0.94, 7.88)
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lic health response to a pandemic. We shall now present
several potential sources of biases and our attempts at
addressing them.
A key potential source of bias is a form of selection
bias [11], related to the fact that not all infected house-
holds were recorded by the City of Milwaukee Health
Department, since not all infected persons came to
medical attention and received testing. One might
expect that some households would come to medical
attention only after having secondary cases in the house-
hold, and that this may have occurred several days after
the onset of symptoms in the index. Such households
would by definition have a secondary case but no early
oseltamivir use (since the index case was not initially
diagnosed). We have attempted to correct for this form
of bias by excluding households for which the index
c a s ed i dn o th a v eac a s er e p o r tf o r m ,s i n c et h e s ew o u l d
be households in which the secondary cases would be
most likely to have triggered the inclusion of the house-
hold in the study. As expected, this moved the univari-
a t eo d d sr a t i of o re a r l yo s e l t a m i v i ru s ea n ds e c o n d a r y
transmission toward the null value of 1, from 0.28 to
0.47. Additionally this selection bias should correlate
with a larger household size. Since household size was
included in the multivariate analysis on the household
level and was found to be positively associated with hav-
ing at least one secondary case (see Table 2), this should
further reduce the bias.
Another potential source of bias is related to the
inclusion criteria for data completeness in the primary
cohort which have differentially excluded households
with different outcomes. For instance, oseltamivir
receipt with a missing date or a missing date for
Table 3 Ages and secondary cases
Infected child/contact child Infected adult/contact adult Infected unknown/contact unknown
n/n % n/n % n/n %
Child index 30/133 22.6% 15/176 8.5% 2/19 10.5%
Adult index 4/40 10% 4/41 9.8% 0/2
Table 4 Secondary attack rates at the individual level
n Secondary infection in household contacts
SAR (95% CI) Univariate OR (95% CI) Multivariate OR (95% CI)
Index oseltamivir usage from his/her onset
Within 1 day 29 0.09 (0.03, 0.17) 0.53 (0.20, 1.37) 0.57 (0.20, 1.62)
1-2 days 11 0.17 (0.00,0.33) 1.06 (0.30, 3.69) 1.11 (0.30, 4.11)
3+ days/No usage 95 0.14 (0.10, 0.19) - -
Household with adult index 37 0.10 (0.04, 0.17) 1.00 1.00
Household with child index 98 0.14 (0.10, 0.19) 1.48 (0.62, 3.51) 1.55 (0.58, 4.15)
Adult contact* 217 0.09 (0.05, 0.13) - -
Child contact* 173 0.20 (0.13, 0.27) 2.71 (1.47, 5.02) 2.79 (1.50, 5.20)
Household size (# of ppl)
≤ 3 48 0.11 (0.04, 0.20) - -
4 41 0.14 (0.07, 0.20) 1.26 (0.48, 3.30) 0.93 (0.32, 2.72)
≥ 5 46 0.14 (0.08, 0.20) 1.25 (0.48, 3.24) 0.74 (0.26, 2.10)
* Multivariable ORs adjusted for unknown age group for 21 contacts via multiple imputations with 10 imputations
Figure 1 Distribution of times from index onset to a first
secondary onset in a household.
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analysis cohort. Although our study is a cohort study,
this form of selection bias is analogous to that present
in all case-control studies, in which the outcome influ-
ences the probability of inclusion in the study; however
this alone does not bias the odds ratio. To see that, con-
sider the odds of inclusion into the primary analysis
cohort for households with vs. without secondary attack
given index oseltamivir, and the corresponding odds
given no index oseltamivir. It is a reasonable first
approximation that those 2 odds (2 ratios of probabil-
ities) are the same, because the probability that index
oseltamivir start date is recorded should not differ
depending on whether there was a secondary case in the
household. Hence, in this approximation, the odds ratio
for inclusion is 1, or, in other words, the odds ratios in
the original population and in the group analyzed in
this study are the same.
The associations between early oseltamivir usage and
reduced risk of secondary attack seen in univariate ana-
lyses were attenuated slightlyi nm u l t i v a r i a t ea n a l y s i s .
This attenuation reflects a positive correlation between
smaller household sizes (which are also protective) and
early index oseltamivir usage in the data.
We do not believe that oseltamivir chemoprophylaxis
contributed to a significant upward bias in our estimate
of the benefit of early oseltamivir index usage. In fact,
out of the 24 households with index oseltamivir usage
on days 0-1 and no secondary attack, only 2 had some
contact chemoprophylaxis.
We found that the time from index onset to the onset
of the first secondary case in the household had a mean
of 3.32 days and a standard deviation of 2.23 days,
broadly consistent with some previous estimates [12,13]
and slightly longer than some other estimates for the
serial interval for H1N1 [14-16]. Moreover the serial
interval estimated from the first secondary case in this
way will be somewhat shorter than the mean time at
which a case will cause secondary infections [17], but
this bias is relatively minor as there a rarely more than
two cases in a household.
We have chosen a case definition for secondary cases
that is slightly different from the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention surveillance definition of influ-
enza-like illness (ILI) as fever plus cough or sore throat.
A similar distinction was made in [14,18], both of which
made estimates of the secondary attack rates for acute
respiratory infection similar to our estimate. Influenza
A/H1N1 occasionally leads to mild self-limiting illness,
and not all the confirmed index cases had ILI. 9 of 55
contacts in the primary analysis cohort who met our
definition of secondary cases failed to meet the standard
ILI definition, and 3 of these individuals were tested and
virologically confirmed.
In our sample, 21% (29/135) of index cases received
oseltamivir within the first two days of symptoms. This
likely represents an upper bound on the true frequency
within the population, since inclusion in our study
depends on coming to medical attention. It is therefore
likely that little impact of oseltamivir treatment on total
transmission of influenza occurred during the spring in
Milwaukee.
Oseltamivir is thought to be effective in reducing
transmission of seasonal influenza in households and
other settings [3,7,8]. Our findings suggest that it is
comparably effective in the setting of H1N1pdm infec-
tion in households. Given the biases inherent in obser-
vational studies conducted in the middle of an emerging
pandemic, randomized studies are needed to assess the
magnitude of this effect more precisely. The United
States has limited supplies of oseltamivir, approximately
enough for ¼ of the population to obtain one course.
While this is larger than the supply of virtually any
developing country, it is less than the stockpile held by
some other wealthy countries, and less than most mod-
els predict would be necessary to undertake a sustained
effort to reduce transmission with antiviral treatment
[19] or chemoprophylaxis. In countries with a larger
stockpile, these findings may support the consideration
for use of treatment as a transmission-reduction mea-
sure, but the findings also suggest that early treatment
of symptomatic cases is essential if transmission-reduc-
tion is to succeed. Given that the benefits of oseltamivir
for the treated patient are best documented (for seasonal
influenza) when treatment is given within 48 hours of
symptom onset (though later treatment can also be ben-
eficial, [20]), the results here, combined with considera-
tions of individual benefit of early treatment in reducing
disease severity [4,5], suggest that additional efforts are
needed to ensure timely access to antiviral drugs.
Conclusions
Early oseltamivir treatment may be beneficial in prevent-
ing H1N1pdm influenza transmission; this may have
relevance to future control measures for influenza pan-
demics. Larger randomized trials are needed to confirm
this finding statistically and to overcome possible biases.
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